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Most legal systems presume innocence of criminal defendants. The accuser bears
the primary responsibility for producing evidence that supports his claim beyond
reasonable doubt, which implies a high relative likelihood of guilt to innocence.
Although presumption of innocence seems the common practice in criminal law,
several countries have promulgated laws that shift the burden of proof to the ac-
cused for specific types of crime. Examples abound in anti-corruption legislation.2
Thailand promulgated a decree in 1975 that stipulated that any unusually wealthy
state official would be presumed guilty of abusing his power and duties. Singapore,
with the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1960, and Hong Kong, with its Indepen-
dent Commission Against Corruption adopted by the Legislative Council in 1974,
have similar legislation. More than 30 members of the Organization of American
States signed a treaty including illicit enrichment provisions to combat transna-
tional bribery in 1996. The view that shifting the burden of proof to the accused
will deter corruption is widely held among corruption experts.3 The logic that
underlies this view will be the main subject of our analysis in this paper.
Various questions relating to the standard of proof in trials have been studied
in the literature. In the context of civil litigation, Sanchirico (1997) shows that
the high evidentiary standards of pro-defendant presumptions economize on liti-
gation costs by filtering out less valuable cases. Shin (1994) provides an analysis
of crimes with victims in which an arbitrator determines the standard of proof and
adjudicates on the basis of evidences submitted by the adversaries. Rubinfeld and
Sappington (1987) and Andreoni (1991) view the court and jury system as one
that chooses an optimal standard of proof to minimize an objective function that
includes the social costs of typeI and typeII errors in convicting or acquitting
a defendant. However, the literature ignores for the most part the fact that legal
presumptions influence the incentives to commit crimes, in particular, the pos-
sibility of collusion between law enforcers and criminals, and law enforcement
costs. Recently, Bernardo et al. (2000) and Boyer et al. (2000) analyzed the rela-
tionship between standards used in establishing guilt and criminal incentives but
they ignore collusion possibilities. Bernardo et al. do not consider the incentive
problems in the law enforcement system.4 The present paper incorporates these
2 There are also examples of shifts in the opposite direction. In the United States, there have been
proposals before the Congress to shift the burden of proof in many tax cases from the defaulting
tax-payers to the Internal Revenue Service (“Features ofIRSoverhaul bill,” USA TODAY, 07/09/98).
3 See, for example, Klitgaard (1988, p. 95). Coldham (1995) is a survey and interpretation of anti-
corruption laws in Africa. He mentions several provisions under the Kenyan, Zimbabwean, Zambian,
and Tanzanian Prevention of Corruption Acts that implicitly or explicitly shift the burden of proof to
the civil servant.
4 Their model is applicable to civil litigation. Davis (1994) and Hay and Spier (1997) analyze burdens
of proof in the case of civil litigation. For criminal cases, the extent of the prosecution’s burden of proof
is the subject of recurrent debates in law journals. Solan (1999) provides a recent view and assessment.
724 BAC AND BAG
elements and offers several new insights into whether a state, through its legislators,
should set high or low standards of proof in apprehending and convicting potential
criminals.5
Similar to Bernardo et al. and Boyer et al., we focus on theex-antecrime-decision
stage as opposed to theex-postrial stage to analyze the role of legal presumptions
in crime prevention. We present a principal–supervisor–agent model in which the
principal represents the government or legislator, the supervisor represents the law
enforcement system, and the agent represents the potential offender. We consider
two legal presumptions that attribute different burdens of evidence for production
and persuasion to the law enforcement system. We ask whether specific, especially
low, crime targets can be implemented under each presumption. Then we evaluate
and compare the corresponding implementation costs. The social implementation
cost objective function consists of the social cost of the crime net of the benefit of the
offender, plus direct law enforcement costs for evidence production and collusion
prevention, trial costs, and verdict error costs. To minimize this objective function
under each presumption rule, the principal has to take into account the fact that
the supervisor’s effort, which is needed to detect criminal behavior, is not directly
observable. Thus, an incentive-compatible law enforcement effort that implements
the crime target must be induced. Moreover, collusion between the supervisor and
the agent must be prevented. We also introduce upper bounds on rewards that can
be paid to the supervisor and on penalties that can be imposed on the criminal
agent and evaluate the impact of these constraints on social costs under each legal
presumption.
Our analysis will highlight several important considerations in evaluating legal
presumptions. How the social costs of wrongful guilty verdicts compare with those
of unpunished offenses is a prime consideration. The larger the cost and proba-
bility of a wrongful guilty verdict, the larger the cost advantage of the relatively
pro-defendant legal presumption, which generates greater accuracy in adjudica-
tion. However, as we show, this conclusion holds only for relatively low crime
targets. On the other hand, stringent evidence standards of strongly pro-defendant
presumptions should feed back to individual incentives to commit crimes6 and
5 For clarification, we say that a legal presumption is more pro-defendant than another if it bears
a heavier burden of proof, both for the production and persuasion, on the accuser by setting a higher
threshold relative likelihood of guilt to innocence for convictions. The concepts of legal presumption
and burden of proof are neither identical nor unrelated. InA Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Garner
(1995, p. 121) defines the burden of proof in two categories, the burden of production to mean “the duty
of producing evidence. . . to have a given issue considered in the case,” and the burden of persuasion
to mean the burden of “convincing the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors” one’s claim.
Legal presumption, on the other hand, is “a judicially applied prediction or legal probability.” Thus, if
legal presumption is modified to favor further the defendant, the accuser’s task of producing evidence
and persuading the fact-finder is relatively difficult so that his burden of proof is heavy. In this case,
we say that the burden of proof is shifted to the accuser.
6 That greater accuracy in adjudication has a deterrent effect is well known (Kaplow (1994, 1998),
Posner (1999)). However, the impact of legal presumptions on criminal deterrence is not so clear.
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thus make evidence production relatively costly. However, when the presump-
tion of innocence is relaxed, both the guilty and the innocent are punished more
often. If the consequent increase in the probability of wrongful convictions rel-
ative to accurate convictions is large, accuracy of adjudication falls and so does
the opportunity cost of becoming a criminal. Furthermore, if this incentive effect
cannot be countered by modifying penalties accordingly, for example, if penal-
ties are already set at the highest level permissible by law, constitutional or hu-
man rights considerations, it generates an increase in law enforcement costs. The
third and equally important channel through which legal presumptions influence
criminal incentives is the possibility of collusion.7 The prospect of a conviction
may prompt the potential felon to make a side payment to the law enforcer at
an early stage prior to the criminal act so that committing a crime is a safe op-
tion and otherwise at the post-detection stage, in which evidence is produced,
to avoid punishment. A fourth consideration is the government’s ability or in-
ability to credibly promise sufficiently high rewards to motivate effectively law
enforcers.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. In
Section 3, we compare two legal presumptions by allowing for collusion and as-
suming unbounded rewards. These assumptions are relaxed in Section 4. Section 5
presents a summary and discussion of our results and concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a three-layer hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor, and
an agent, all of whom risk-neutral, and in which the supervisor’s and the agent’s
outside options are normalized to zero. The principal represents the government,
the supervisor represents the law enforcement system, i.e., the chain from police
to prosecution or an auditor who may be either a government official or entirely
independent, and the agent is the potential offender.
We consider the crime to be corruption. The agent is a civil servant or bu-
reaucrat and the potential crime is a violation of duty for private gain, such as
fraud, spying for foreign secret services, or money laundering. The agent, to
whom the principal delegates authority, can misuse authority for a private gain ofz
7 Becker and Stigler (1974) is the first formal analysis ofex-postcollusion in law enforcement.
Collusion cannot be ignored, judging by the evidence from many regions of the world. In 1989,
21% of bribery occurred within the law enforcement sector in one Chinese city, according to Li and
Hung (1998). Klitgaard (1988, pp. 98–100) provides striking accounts of internal corruption in the
Hong Kong Police Department during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Many recent instances of police cor-
ruption can be found on the internet. For an authentic account of the police’s involvement with a
group of criminals, namely, drug-dealers in the United States, see May 1998 General Accounting
Office, General Government Division (B-277817) report, “Law Enforcement: Information on Drug
Related Police Corruption.” In particular, see Appendix III: Examples of publicly disclosed investiga-
tions of drug-related police corruption in large cities between 1988 and 1998. These are available at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/gao/gg98111.pdf. For an extensive discussion and anal-
ysis of a judicial corruption case in the seventh circuit, Cook County, see DiBiagio (1998).
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dollars, that is, choose to be corrupt (b̂= 1) or remain honest (b̂= 0), with z being
common knowledge. We take the agent’s, possibly mixed, strategyb ∈ [0,1],
i.e., his likelihood of being corrupt, as a proxy for the level of corruption. The
supervisor’s task is to monitor the agent, collect evidence, and, if any, submit it
to the principal. The principal can observe neither the supervisor’s monitoring
effort nor the outcome of monitoring, nor whether the supervisor and the agent
collude.8 While the disputable issue under the supervisor’s investigation and the
collected evidence, if any, are about occurrence of corruption, the implementation
objective of the principal concerns the unobservable, hence nonverifiable, level of
corruption.
The following evidentiary standards are assumed to be common knowledge.
The first type of evidence is high quality (type-h), in that it provides very strong
support for the hypothesis that the agent is corrupt, i.e., thatb̂ = 1 is realized. The
second type of evidence is considered as suggestive, low quality (type-l ) evidence
of corruption.9 Type-h and type-l evidence are potentially admissible in courts, a
choice we leave to the principal. Evidence of quality lower than type-l is never
admitted in court, hence, it cannot be used to penalize the agent. We consider any
such evidence to be equivalent to no evidence. Below, we link type-h and type-l
evidence to legal presumptions and the burden of proof.
The supervisor uses the following technology to generate evidence. Given a
monitoring effortm, with probability 1−µ(m), the supervisor is not able to obtain
any evidence. Regardless of the agent’s action, the supervisor receives no useful
information. With probabilityµ(m), monitoring results in some evidence but the
likelihood of its quality, type-h or type-l , will depend on the agent’s action. If the
agent is guilty, i.e.,̂b = 1, the supervisor generates evidence of typee= h, l with
probability peg, wherep
h
g + plg = 1. The corresponding probabilities if the agent
is innocent, i.e.,̂b = 0 arephi and pli , with phi + pli = 1.
We assume thatphg > p
h
i so that high quality evidence is more likely when the
agent is guilty rather than innocent. We make two further sets of assumptions. First,
to reduce notational burden, we assume thatphi = 0 so thatpli = 1 and 0< phg < 1,
which makes type-h evidence, if produced, proof of guilt or corruption. None
of our qualitative results depends on this normalization; all that is needed is for
type-h evidence to be relatively more informative.10 Second, 0< plg< 1, so that
8 Three-layer hierarchies in economic models that allow for the possibility of side contracts were
introduced formally by Tirole (1986; 1992).
9 A type-h evidence could be having the agent on video handing over a roll of cash. Type-l evidence
can be thought of as a consistent story of corruption, a noisy collection of facts that reasonably support
the hypothesis that the agent is corrupt.
10The following conditional probabilities are easily verified. Prob (agent is guilty| evidence is
type-h)= 1 and prob(agent is guilty| evidence is type-l )= bplg/(bplg + (1 − b))< 1. On the other
hand, prob(agent is innocent| evidence is type-h) = 0 and prob(agent is innocent|evidence is type-
l ) = (1−b)/(bplg+ (1−b)) > 0. Therefore, type-h evidence is more informative than type-l vidence.
The only result that would be affected if we drop the normalization is Lemma 3.
LAW ENFORCEMENT 727
with evidence of low quality the possibility that the agent is guilty cannot be
ruled out.
Given the agent’s corruption strategyb and the supervisor’s effortm, if the su-
pervisor and the agent do not collude, the supervisor will produce type-h evidence
with probabilitybµ(m)phg and type-l evidence with probabilitybµ(m)(1− phg)+
(1− b)µ(m). The supervisor’s cost of exerting effortm is c(m), which is twice
continuously differentiable, increasing and weakly convex inm, with c(0) = 0
andc′(m)→ 0 asm→ 0. The success probability of monitoring,µ: [0, m+)→
[0, 1), is also twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave
in m, with µ(0) = 0, µ′(m) → ∞ asm → 0, andµ′(m) → 0 asm → m+.
These assumptions guarantee that the supervisor will exert a positive effort, given
a positive reward for conviction, and that the equilibrium effort will be bounded
away fromm+ for any finite reward.11
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution or supervisor to produce the
evidence that establishes his claim beyond reasonable doubt. When the prosecution
produces the evidence, the burden shifts to the accused to persuade the tribunal that
the claim does not hold beyond reasonable doubt. The weight of the prosecution’s
burden of proof, or the level of doubt considered to be reasonable, is determined
in our model by the principal. We consider two choices based on the classification
of evidence.
A heavy burden of proof stipulates tight screening. The presumption is strongly
pro-defendant so that the supervisor must have type-h evidence at hand because
courts will reject accusations based on type-l evidence. We refer to this case as
presumptionI, or, loosely, the presumed innocence rule. Under presumptionG,
or the presumed guilt rule, the agent’s or the defendant’s burden of proof is rela-
tively heavy. When the supervisor submits type-l evidence, the agent is presumed
guilty so that guilt is established unless the agent disproves the accusation. Recall
that, under presumptionI, type-h evidence proves guilt by assumption; hence, it
cannot be contested. Under presumptionG, type-l evidence can be challenged and
disproved by the agent. We assume that an innocent agent has a better chance of
creating enough doubt of guilt to induce acquittal, with probabilityri , than a guilty
agent, with probabilityrg; so we let 0< rg < ri < 1.
A trial that meets the standard of admissible evidence of presumptionj = I, G,
costsL j . The agent is tried, under presumptionI, with probabilitybµ(m)phg and,
11The supervisor’sex-anteefforts in controlling corruption is what is known in the literature as
enforcement by monitoring (Mookherjee and Png, 1992). The method of enforcement, that is, whether
the supervisor’s effort is interpreted as an examination of an individual’s possible involvement in some
corrupt activity yet unobserved, or whether it is interpreted as an investigation to determine who might
be involved in a known corruption scandal is immaterial for the analysis.Ex-ante, the supervisor does
not know whether the particular individual is corrupt, or what type of evidence he will be able to collect,
if any. As Kaplow and Shavell (1994) show, investigation and examination may differ in costs and may
have differential effects on behavior if individuals are allowed to report their own criminal acts. We do
not pursue this line of analysis.
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under presumptionG, with probabilityµ(m).12 Thus, expected trial costs are
ELI = bµ(m)phg LI and ELG = µ(m)LG .
Notice that, givenb andm, ELI <ELG if LI = LG because the parties are more
likely to end up in the courtroom under presumptionG. Expected trial costs under
presumptionG would be even higher ifLI < LG , i.e., a trial would cost less
under presumptionI because the verdict would take less time and resources when
screening is tight and the court admits only high quality evidence. In the analysis,
we assume thatLI ≤ LG .
An incentive scheme under presumptionj = I,G is denoted by〈w jA, w jS,
Rj , F〉. It consists of a pair of base wages,w jA andw jS, respectively, for the
agent and the supervisor, a rewardRj for the supervisor upon conviction of
the agent’s guilt, and a penaltyF j imposed on the agent for being found guilty.
The supervisor’s reward,Rj , depends on the type of evidence used in establishing
guilt, soRj = Rjh or Rjl for evidence of typeh or l .13
Let ERj and EFj denote the principal’s expected reward payments and the
expected penalty or fine costs of the agent, respectively. The penaltyF j may
be monetary or non-monetary. We assume that the penalty is a fine and that it
accures to the principal. On the other hand, nonmonetary penalties do not appear
directly in the principal’s objective function. This difference is inconsequential
for the comparative analysis in this paper because the relevant component of the
principal’s objective is the wage paid to the agent less the expected fine collection,
which is zero for nonmonetary penalties. This component will always amount to
the same value because of the agent’s participation constraint.
The expected social cost of verdict errors is denotedCVEj . We haveCVEI =
πIu Cu andCVE
G = πGu Cu + πGwCw, whereCu andCw denote the social cost of
unpunished offenses and wrongful convictions, respectively, andπ ju andπ
j
w are
the corresponding probabilities. Thus,
CVEG = b̄[1− µ(m)+ µ(m)plgrg]Cu + (1− b̄)µ(m)pli (1− ri )Cw,
and
CVEI = b̄[1− µ(m)+ µ(m)plg]Cu.
Given the same law enforcement effort, a wrongful conviction is less likely under
12That the probability of a trial under presumptionG does not depend on the agent’s action is an
artifact of our simplifying assumptions; it should not be interpreted literally. The basic idea is that,
under presumptionG, the standard of admissible evidence is weak so that the agent, whether guilty or
innocent, faces a relatively large probability of being tried.
13Our results are not affected if we assume that the supervisor is rewarded for simply bringing in
evidence, nor if we assume that the principal cannot distinguish between the two types of evidence and
that the supervisor receives a single reward. The proof is available on request.
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the presumption of innocence and an unpunished offense is less likely under the
presumption of guilt.14
Let0 denote the social costs of the corruption under consideration, which may
consists of the loss of public confidence in bureaucracy, lost opportunities and
economic distortions. Also, let
LECj = w jA + w jS+ ERj − EFj (1)
denote law enforcement costs that exclude trial costs. Then, the overall social costs
of implementing anȳb can be written as
TCj = g(LECj + ELj )+ CVEj + b̄0, (2)
whereg(·) represents the social costs of public funds, which measures poten-
tially distortionary taxation and other social opportunity costs of financing law
enforcement and litigation. Note that, if a presumption rule has a cost advantage
in implementing a target corruption level for the linear specificationg(x) = x, it
continues to have a cost advantage under any weakly convexg(x).15 Therefore, we
choose the linear from,g(LECj + ELj ) = LECj + ELj .
The agent’s expected benefitb̄z from corruption will appear as a negative item
in theLECj component of Eq. (2), once the agent’s participation constraint is taken
into account. Thus, it is not included separately to avoid double counting. For any
given corruption target̄b, the cost̄b0 is fixed and may be ignored, as we do below,
in the cost minimization exercise.
For any given corruption targetb̄, under each presumption rulej , the principal
would like to minimize
TCj = LECj + ELj + CVEj , (3)
subject to the moral hazard constraint in law enforcement, participation constraints
and collusion-proofness constraints. These constraints are formulated below.
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. Given a corruption targetb̄, th
principal determines the legal presumption,I orG, and a corresponding incentive
scheme. If the supervisor and the agent both accept the incentives scheme, the
game proceeds to thex-antecollusion stage in which the agent may offer a
side payment to the supervisor to avoid being monitored. If the supervisor is not
collusive or they do not collude, the two parties play a monitoring-corruption
game in which the supervisor determines his effortm and the agent determines
simultaneously his corruption strategyb. Once the equilibrium strategies are played
and the outcome ( ˆµ, b̂) is observed, another occasion for collusion arisesex-post,
14Under our assumptions,πIw = 0,πGw > 0; hence,πGw > πIw andπIu > πGu > 0.
15Weak convexity ofg(·) would account for nondecreasing marginal social opportunity cost of
funds.
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when the supervision generates evidence of type-l or type-h. If the supervisor is
collusive, the agent may make a side payment to the supervisor in return for the
destruction of the evidence. In the final stage, the supervisor submits his evidence
to the principal, the agent may or may not be tried and, if tried, be convicted or
acquitted. In this stage, the principal applies the incentive scheme to determine the
payoffs for all parties.
Given an incentive scheme, letU ji be theex-anteexpected utility ofi = A, S
under presumptionj = I, G.
The agent’s expected utility and participation constraint can be written as16
U jA = w jA + bz− EFj (b, m) ≥ 0, (4)
where,
EFI(b,m) = bphgµ(m)FI, and
EFG(b,m) = [b(phg + (1− phg)(1− rg))+ (1− b)(1− ri )]µ(m)FG .
The supervisor’s expected utility and participation constraint is
U jS = w jS+ ERj (b,m)− c(m) ≥ 0, (5)
where,
ERI(b,m) = bphgµ(m)RI, and
ERG(b,m) = b[phg RGh + (1− phg)(1− rg)RGl ]µ(m)+ (1− b)(1− ri )µ(m)RGl .
Initially, ignore collusion possibilities or suppose that the supervisor is not col-
lusive. In the monitoring-corruption game, the agent and the supervisor determine
noncooperatively the strategiesb ∈ [0,1] andm ≥ 0. Thus, to implement a cor-
ruption target̄b ∈ (0,1), the incentive scheme must ensure not only that the Nash
equilibrium strategy of the agent isb̄, but also that the effort levelm constitutes
the supervisor’s best reply to the agent’s strategyb̄.17
16We make the simplifying assumption thatL j is borne by the principal, which is mostly innocuous
because any trial cost borne by the agent will ultimately be incurred by the principal due to the binding
participation constraint of the agent. The same reasoning holds for the supervisor.
17Note that we have ignored two extremes,b̄ = 0 and b̄ = 1. No principal should care about
implementingb̄ = 1. On the other hand,̄b = 0 cannot be Nash implemented under presumptionI.
The supervisor’s best reply tob = 0 is m= 0 but b= 0 is not a best reply tom = 0 because type-h
evidence cannot be produced. Under presumptionG, implementingb̄ = 0 is, in principle, possible.
However, if the agent is induced to chooseb = 0 in equilibrium, it is common knowledge that the agent
is honest. Therefore, any accusing report, which must contain only type-l evidence, must be false and
there is no reason to punish the agent.
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The first equilibrium condition is that the penaltyF j establish the agent’s in-
difference betweenb = 1 andb = 0, given monitoring effortm. Using (4) and













The second equilibrium condition is that the supervisor be induced to exert the

















]+ (1− b̄)(1− ri )RGl = c′(m)µ′(m) , (7G)
under presumptionG. It is easy to check that, givenb̄ ∈ (0,1), a higher monitoring
effort can be induced by increasing the reward(s)Rj through (7I) or (7G) and
decreasing the penaltyF j through (6) at the same time. Thus, if collusion is not
an issue and rewards and penalties are not bounded from above, the principal can
induce any effort level by using the two instruments,F j andRj .
When the supervisor is collusive, we assume that the supervisor and the agent
collude whenever the corresponding expected surplus is strictly positive.18 Denote
by Ũ ji the gross expected utility ofi = A, S from ex-antecollusion. The surplus
from ex-antecollusion is negative if
U jS − Ũ jS ≥ Ũ jA −U jA.
Under ex-antecollusion, the supervisor exerts no effort so that the agent will
optimize by setting̃b = 1 and obtain the payoff̃U jA = z+ w jA. The supervisor’s
expected utility is given by (5), if the parties do not collude, and byŨ jS = w jS, if
they collude. Therefore, theex-antecollusion-proofness constraint is
ERj (b̄,m)− c(m) ≥ w jA + z−U jA, j = I,G. (8)
18One way of introducing the costs of enforcing collusive agreements would be to assume, as in
Tirole (1992), that each dollar of side payment from the agent is worth 0< t < 1 dollars to the supervisor.
All our qualitative results will hold under this or any alternative formulations that also include fixed
costs of collusion. We prefer the simpler exposition.
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Hence, the supervisor’s net expected surplus from monitoring must be at least
equal toz + w jA − U jA, which is the maximum side payment that the agent is
willing to pay in order to avoid being monitored.
Theex-postcollusion-proofness constraint is relatively straightforward. To en-
sure that the supervisor reports the evidence produced, type-h or type-l , the cor-
responding reward should not fall below the agent’s expected penalty:19
RI ≥ FI, RGh ≥ FG, RGl ≥ (1− rg) · FG .20 (9)
3. COMPARING SOCIAL COSTS OF PRESUMPTION RULES
Consider the principal’s problem of determining the presumption rule that lowers
corruption to any target level̄b ∈ (0,1) at minimum social cost. Solving this
problem involves first determining an optimal monitoring effortm under each
presumption rule through an incentive mechanism and then comparing overall
social costs in Eq. (3) to obtain the minimum.
As a first step, we consider the sub-problem of minimizing only law enforcement
costs,LECj , under the same set of constraints. This exercise will highlight the
impact of collusion possibilities and provide a useful benchmark for later analysis.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that the rewards paid for successful evidence production
and the penalties imposed on the convicted are not bounded above and that the
supervisor may collude with the agent. If the objective is to minimize law en-
forcement costs only,any corruption target̄b ∈ (0,1) can be implemented under
either legal presumption,but minimized law enforcement costs will be lower under
presumptionI.
Law enforcement costs for each presumption will be minimized by inducing a
unique minimal enforcement effort,mjz, that is necessary and sufficient to satisfy
the ex-antecollusion-proofness constraint,with mIz < m
G




The minimized law enforcement costs are:LECj = c(mjz)− b̄z, for j = I,G.
The proof is in the Appendix. The incentive scheme that solves the sub-problem
of minimizing law enforcement costs makes the participation constraints (4) and
(5) of the agent and the supervisor binding, so thatw jA − EFj (b̄,m) = −b̄z, and
w
j
S+ERj (b̄,m) = c(m). These expressions lead to the minimized cost expression
19We obtained the same qualitative results under the assumption thatex-postcollusion is impossible
to sustain when the supervisor has only type-l evidence, possibly because the low quality evidence can
be reproduced even after it is destroyed.
20 The guilty agent’s expected penalty isFG if the supervisor has type-h evidence and (1− rg).
FG if he has type-l evidence. The innocent agent’s expected penalty when the supervisor has type-l
evidence is lower because he can disprove more easily type-l evidence, with probabilityri > rg.
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in Lemma 1, which consists of the supervisor’s monitoring cost,c(mjz), minus the
expected social benefit of the crime,b̄z.
Lemma 1 shows that collusion prevention costs are higher under presumptionG.
The surplus fromex-antecollusion is larger because the agent is willing to make
a larger side payment in order to avoid being monitored, and convicted with a
higher probability, under presumptionG. To have the supervisor reject such a side
payment, the principal increases the expected reward payments to induce a higher
monitoring effortmGz > m
I
z and higher costsc(m
G
z ) > c(m
I
z ). Thus, the need to
prevent collusion indirectly increases the resources that the principal should devote
to evidence production relatively more under presumptionG.21
Lemma 1 has an interesting implication. If rewards and penalties are not bounded
above and if we ignore the social costs of verdict errors and assume potentially col-
lusive law enforcers, we should adopt pro-defendant legal presumptions regardless
of the target level of corruption.22
The addition of verdict error costs and trial costs affects the choice between
the two presumption rules in a subtle and interesting manner. Expected trial costs
should be higher under presumptionG for any induced monitoring effort because
the probability of a trial is relatively high andLI ≤ LG . The effect of verdict error
costs, on the other hand, is less clear-cut. Presumption of guilt involves relatively
more typeI errors, i.e., punishing the innocent, and fewer typeII errors, i.e.,
acquitting the guilty. IfCw is much larger thanCu, i.e., if society emphasizes
minimizing typeI errors at the expense of increased typeII rrors, presumption
of innocence dominates presumption of guilt.
Recall that expected verdict error costs are
CVEG = b̄[1− µ(m)+ µ(m)plgrg]Cu + (1− b̄)µ(m)pli (1− ri )Cw, and
CVEI = b̄[1− µ(m)+ µ(m)plg]Cu.
Using these and the expressions for expected trial costs, we have
CVEG(m)+ ELG(m) < CVEI(m)+ ELI(m),
21 Increases in the costs of producing evidence due indirectly to the sole purpose of eliminating
collusion possibilities are called collusion prevention costs. In the absence of upper bounds on penal-
ties and if collusion can be ruled out, evidence production costs could be made arbitrarily small by
imposing arbitrarily large penalties. If collusion cannot be ruled out, collusion-proofness constraints
alone determine monitoring effort and costs, hence we name the termc(mjz) collusion prevention costs.
22 It can be shown that adding trial costs would not change this conclusion because trial costs are
increasing in induced monitoring effort and the principal motivated by minimizing law enforcement
costs plus expected trial costs would still induce the minimal effort implied by collusion-proofness and
yield lower overall costs under the presumption of innocence. However, adding verdict error costs to
the objective function may change this conclusion as we show below.
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if and only if
b̄ >
pli (1− ri )Cw + LG
plg(1− rg)Cu + pli (1− ri )Cw + phg LI
≡ b̄1. (10)
Assume thatLG is not too high so that̄b1 is well-defined and less than one.
Using the agent’s and the supervisor’s participation constraints satisfied with
equality, we can writeLECj (m) = c(m) − b̄z.23 Thus, the social cost expression
(3) becomes
TCj (m) = c(m)− b̄z+ CVEj (m)+ ELj (m). (11)
The following lemma follows directly from (11).
LEMMA 2. Ignore the collusion possibilities. If any identical monitoring effort
m is induced under the two presumption rules, presumption of guilt will involve
strictly lower social costs if and only if̄b > b̄1.
Now let mjX minimize the social cost expression (11) under presumption rule
j . That is,
c′(mIX )
µ′(mIX )
≥ b̄ phg[Cu − LI ], and
c′(mGX )
µ′(mGX )
≥ b̄(1− plgrg)Cu − (1− b̄)(1− ri )pli Cw − LG,
holding with equality ifmjX > 0.24 One can check thatmIX >mGX if and only
if b̄ < b̄1.
We assumeCu> LI , i.e., that the cost of a trial is less than the social cost
of letting an offense go unpunished, which implies thatmIX > 0. However, the
right-hand side of the second condition may be negative, which would imply
thatmGX = 0. This leads to the following Lemma on implementation possibilities
under the presumption of guilt.
23To implement̄b at minimum social costs, these participation constraints must hold with equality.
See the discussion following Lemma 1 or its proof.
24By adopting the simple linear form for the functiong(·) in Eq. (2) instead of its general implicit
form, we do not alter any of the results qualitatively. Analysis in terms of the implicit form,g(·), will
lead to similar conditions determining the solutionsmjX . Equation (11) would be revised to read
TCj (m) = g(c(m) − b̄z) + CVEj (m) + ELj (m). Sinceg′′(·) ≥ 0 and−b̄z is constant, the first- and
second-order properties ofc(m)− b̄zandg(m) are qualitatively the same.
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LEMMA 3. There exists a critical corruption target
βG ≡ (1− ri )p
l
i Cw + LG(
1− plgrg
)
Cu + (1− ri )pli Cw
(12)
such that any corruption target̄b can be implemented under the presumed guilt
rule if and only ifb̄>βG .
We provide a sketch of the proof. It is easy to verify that 0<βG < b̄1. The
critical βG sets the right-hand side of the inequality definingmGX equal to zero,
which implies a positivemGX if b̄>βG andmGX = 0 if b̄≤βG . For low corruption
targets, i.e.,̄b≤βG , the marginal social cost of effort exceeds the marginal social
benefit at any positive effort level. Hence, the likelihood of an offense is low
and a conviction based on the low-quality evidence is rather likely to be wrong,
which is socially costly. Adding the cost of a trial, the principal would not find it
beneficial to induce any monitoring effort. If no monitoring effort is induced, the
agent’s best response would be to switch tob = 1 and the target corruption level
b̄≤βG would not be implemented. To implement such low levels of corruption,
the principal has no choice but to switch to presumption of innocence.25 L mma 3
concerns implementation possibilities only without a consideration of the collusion
constraints.
The cost-minimizing effort levelsmIX andmGX are both unique and positive
for b̄ > βG because the objective function (3) is strictly convex inm. We are now
ready to present the first set of results. For these results, we do not impose any
upper-bound constraints on rewards or penalties.
PROPOSITION1. If the supervisor is not collusive, so that the collusion-proof-
ness constraints do not apply or bind, all corruption targets̄b< b̄1 can be imple-
mented at smaller overall social costs under the presumed innocence rule. The
opposite ranking obtains for̄b> b̄1. For b̄ = b̄1, the two presumption rules will
involve the same social costs.
Proof. Consider̄b> b̄1. By Lemma 2,TCG(mIX )<TCI(mIX ). On the other
hand,b̄> b̄1 impliesmIX <mGX , both of which are strictly positive-valued be-
causemIX > 0. SincemGX is the optimal effort under the presume guilt rule,
TCG(mGX )≤TCG(mIX ). Thus,TCG(mGX )<TCI(mIX ).
Similar arguments apply in the remaining cases,b̄< b̄1 andb̄ = b̄1. Q.E.D.
25A similar lower boundβI on implementable corruption targets would arise under presumption
of innocence if we drop the normalization assumption that high quality evidence used in establishing
guilt is noiseless. However, since high-quality evidence is less noisy than low quality evidence, the
probability of punishing the innocent would be smaller under presumption of innocence, which would
implyβI < βG . The range of implementable targets would still be larger under the presumed innocence
rule, or, there would be a range of low corruption targets that can be implemented only by presuming
innocence.
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The result that the overall social costs of implementing high corruption tar-
gets are smaller under guilt presumption is quite intuitive. As the probability of
an offense goes to one, the probability of a wrongful conviction vanishes under
presumption of guilt; however, under presumption of innocence, the probability
of an unpunished offense tends to increase. Then, overall social costs of verdict
errors tilts the balance in favor of the presumed guilt rule. Note that, by Lemma 3,
presumption of innocence is the only alternative forb̄≤βG . Forb̄∈ (βG, b̄1), both
rules can be used but presumption of innocence has the cost advantage.
Proposition 1 ignores the possibility of collusion. In the next proposition we
show that introducing collusion possibilities generates a bias in favor of presump-
tion of innocence.
PROPOSITION2. If the supervisor is collusive, all corruption targetsb̄≤ b̄1
can be implemented at smaller overall social costs under the presumed innocence
rule. For b̄> b̄1, presumption of guilt generates lower social costs if mGX ≥mGz ,
that is, if the collusion constraints are not binding. However, if mGX <mGz , no
clear-cut ranking of the two presumption rules can be offered.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that a minimal effortmjz must be induced
to preventex-antecollusion under presumption rulej . Moreover,mIz <m
G
z . By
Lemma 3,b̄ ∈ (0, βG ] cannot be implemented by the presumed guilt rule even
without imposing theex-antecollusion-proofness constraint. To see whether the
presumed innocence rule can implement these targets, we must consider theex-ant
collusion-proofness constraint.
Consider̄b ∈ (0, b̄1]. If mIX ≥ mIz , theex-antecollusion-proofness constraint
is not binding under presumption of innocence and Proposition 1 would apply, so
that the presumed innocence rule would be optimal. On the other hand, ifmIX <
mIz , theex-antecollusion-proofness constraint is binding under presumption of in-
nocence so that the principal would inducemIz , which is feasible.
26 In this case, we
must also havemGX <mGz becausem
GX ≤mIX andmIz <mGz . Thus, theex-ante
collusion-proofness constraint is binding also under presumption of guilt so that the
principal must induce effortmGz for b̄ ∈ (βG, b̄1]. We already know that̄b ∈ (0, βG ]
is not implementable. For̄b ∈ (βG, b̄1], TCI(mIz )<TCI(mGz )<TCG(mGz ). The
first inequality follows from the fact thatTCI(m) is increasing inm the further
away we get from unconstrained optimal effort,mIX , while the last inequality
follows from the assumption thatb̄ ≤ b̄1.
Consider̄b> b̄1. For any induced effort, implementing any suchb̄ by presuming
guilt generates lower social costs if theex-antecollusion-proofness constraint is
not binding, which is the case presented in Proposition 1. This case will obtain if
mGX ≥ mGz . SupposemGX <mGz so that the principal must induce the constrained





is possible to havemIz <m
Ix while mGX <mGz . The principal may still be able to
26We emphasize feasibility because, under the presumed guilt rule, no positive effort level is feasible.
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induce the unconstrained effort solution,mIX , under presumption of innocence,
which may yield a lower total social cost than does the constrained effort solution
under presumption of guilt. Thus, no clear-cut ranking obtains and the comparison
between the two presumption rules depends on whether the optimal effort levels
can be induced, or, if not, how far the induced feasible effort lies from the optimal,
unconstrained level under each presumption rule, on the specification of the effort
cost functionc(·), on the monitoring technologyµ(·), and on other parameters.27
Q.E.D.
Introducing the possibility of collusion can only make the case for presump-
tion of innocence stronger and possibly induce the principal to implement even
relatively high corruption targets, i.e.,b̄> b̄1, through presumption of innocence.
This is likely to be the case if the collusion constraint is binding, so that collusion
prevention costs are positive under presumption of guilt but not under presumption
of innocence. We highlight below the factors affectingb̄1 that play a crucial role
in determining the choice of the presumption rule. Proposition 3 follows directly
from the definition of̄b1 given in (10).
PROPOSITION3. The critical value for̄b1 is larger and presumption of inno-
cence becomes the better choice for a wider range of corruption targets, th larger
is the social cost and the probability of a wrongful conviction,the smaller is the
social cost and the probability of an unpunished offense, and the larger is the cost
of a trial under presumption of guilt relative to presumption of innocence.
The factors mentioned above also affect the lower implementable boundβG
under presumption of guilt, defined, in Lemma 3, in the same way that they affect
b̄1. Thus, an increase in the accuracy in adjudication implies that relatively high
corruption targets are implemented at lower social cost by presuming innocence
and, at the same time, the low range (0, βG) of corruption targets that cannot be
implemented by presuming guilt is enlarged.
4. LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS UNDER BOUNDED REWARDS
AND PENALTIES
In this section, we first introduce a constraint on available resources to motivate
law enforcers, maintaining the assumption that they may collude with the bureau-
crats, and then we consider the impact of upper bounds on penalties. We show that,
in each of these cases, presumption of guilt may become the preferred alternative.
The rewards to motivate law enforcers in gathering type-h evidence can become
arbitrarily large, especially as the target level of corruption approaches zero (see the
expression ofRI in the proof of Lemma 1). If the government’s law enforcement
budget is limited, it will not be credible to promise such large rewards. LetR̄be the
27Note that we do not solve fully for the optimal incentive mechanisms. We only determine
the incentives, i.e., the wages, rewards, and penalties, necessary for the comparative analysis in
Proposition 2.
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maximum reward that the principal can afford. With this upper bound on rewards,
the principal may not be able to induce the minimal collusion-proof effort,mjz.
Thus, full corruption will occur. We show that the relevance of this undesirable
effect depends on the presumption rule.
PROPOSITION4. Suppose that the supervisor may collude with the agent. There
exist lower bounds̄RG and R̄I(b̄) on the maximal reward̄R such that any cor-
ruption targetb̄ ∈ (βG, 1) can be implemented through presumptionG if and
only if R̄≥ R̄G, and any corruption target̄b ∈ (0,1) can be implemented through
presumptionI if and only if R̄≥ R̄I(b̄). R̄I(b̄) is decreasing in̄b and becomes
arbitrarily large as b̄ goes to 0. Thus, given any finiteR̄≥ R̄G, there exists a
critical b̄I(R̄)> 0 such that,if βG < b̄I(R̄), the rangeb̄ ∈ (βG, b̄I(R̄)) can be
implemented only through presumptionG, while the range(0, βG ], is not imple-
mentable under either presumption rule.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix.
Adopting a pro-prosecution presumption (G) is the only way to implement cor-
ruption targets̄b ∈ (βG, b̄I(R̄)), if b̄I(R̄) exceedsβG , provided that the maximal
reward is bounded above but exceedsR̄G . The critical bounds̄RI(b̄) and R̄G are
derived from the equilibrium conditions (7I) and (7G). The intuition is as follows.
At these bounds, the rewards are just enough to induce the minimal effortmjz that
preventsex-antecollusion. The supervisor’s expected rewards,ERj , depend pro-
portionately on both the corruption target,b̄, to be implemented and the reward(s),
Rj . Whenb̄ is low, relatively high rewards should be promised under presumption
I to induce the minimal collusion-proof monitoring effort. This result follows
because the probability of producing high quality evidence and being rewarded is
relatively low under presumptionI. On the other hand, relatively modest rewards
induce the appropriate effort given the higher probability of generating at least
type-l evidence, which is admissible in court under presumptionG. Therefore, the
reward constraint will provide a stronger incentive with a heavy burden of proof
on the supervisor under presumptionI. This result provides a possible explana-
tion for the choice of several countries that lack the proper resources or have law
enforcement agencies that are inept in generating high quality evidence to change
legal presumptions and shift the burden of proof to the accused in their fight against
corruption. In several developing countries in which human rights are weak, the
cost of a wrongful conviction may not be deemed as high as in developed countries.
This would imply a low value forβG in our model and generate a stronger case
for the assumption in Proposition 4 thatβG < b̄I(R̄). In that case, presumption of
guilt would be preferred in reducing corruption to levels in the range (βG, b̄I(R̄))
if rewards are bounded.
To focus on how the choice of the legal presumption is affected when there is a
maximum penaltyF̄ that can be imposed on the agent, we assume no possibility
of collusion. The impact of introducing collusion, as shown in Lemma 1, is to
impose a constraint on the minimal effort that must be induced, asm≥mjz. Since
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the introduction of an upper bound on penalties will also impose a lower bound
on effort levels, neglecting the possibility of collusion will keep the exposition
simple.
Effort levelsmIX andmGX are defined as the optimal effort levels to be induced
when collusion is impossible or not binding, assuming that there are no limits on
the penalties that can be imposed on the convicted agent. If the penalty constraint
binds, the principal has no choice but to impose the maximal penaltyF̄ , which
induces minimal effort levels,mI andmG , that are determined uniquely through
the agent’s equilibrium indifference conditions. Hence, we have
z
F̄
= phgµ(mI), and (13)
z
F̄
= [phg + (1− phg)(1− rg)− (1− ri )]µ(mG). (14)
Clearly,mG <mI if and only if:(
1− phg
)
(1− rg)> 1− ri . (15)
Intuitively, if switching from the presumed innocence to the presumed guilt rule
leads to an increase in the probability of avoiding an unpunished offense, i.e.,
avoiding a typeII error, that exceeds the increase in the probability of a wrongful
conviction, i.e., committing a typeI error, the incentives to remain innocent are
strengthened. As a result, the same corruption targetb̄ can be implemented under
presumptionG through less intensive monitoring. Thus, the impact of introduc-
ing a penalty constraint is similar to the effect of introducing the possibility of
collusion. Induced effort levels cannot fall below a levelmj , which is specific to
the legal presumption rulej . If (15) holds (fails), introducing a penalty constraint
favors presumption of guilt (innocence). Obviously, if the penalty constraint is
not binding, the principal induces the unconstrained optimal effortmjX under
presumptionj .
PROPOSITION5. Suppose that the supervisor is noncollusive and that the su-
pervisor’s reward is not bounded above. Assume that(15)holds. Then,all b̄> b̄1
can be implemented at lower social costs under the presumed guilt rule. For
b̄ ∈ (βG, b̄1), the targets are implemented at lower social cost by presuming
innocence,if the penalty constraint is not binding, i.e., if mIX ≥mI . No clear-cut
ranking of the presumption rules can be offered if mIX <mI .
The proof is omitted as it follows the same arguments already made in the proof
of Proposition 2.28 For b̄ > b̄1, if the penalty constraint is not binding under pre-
sumption of guilt, Proposition 1 applies and the principal adopts the presumed
28The difference is superficial. Instead of having a minimal effort constraint imposed by collusion-
proofness, we have a minimal effort constraint imposed by maximal penalties.
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guilt rule by inducing effortmGX . Condition (15), combined with̄b> b̄1 imply-
ing thatmGX >mIX , guarantees that, if the penalty constraint is binding under
presumption of guilt, it must also be binding under presumption of innocence. For
b̄ < b̄1, we cannot provide a clear ranking of the presumption rules unless we know
that the penalty constraint is not binding under presumption of innocence. Thus,
especially for corruption targets slightly lower thanb̄1, if the penalty constraint is
binding under presumption of innocence, presumption of guilt may generate lower
social costs under (15). An intuitive condition in terms of the probabilities of type
I and typeII errors was given above.
The importance of the impact of introducing a penalty constraint can be seen
from (14). The smaller is the maximal penaltȳF that can be imposed relative
to the private benefitz accruing to the offender, the more likely is the case that
the principal’s effort choice will be constrained. Furthermore, the larger is the
difference between the left and the right-hand sides of (15), the smaller ismG
relative tomI ; hence, the stronger is the case for presumption of guilt.
5. CONCLUSION
The standard approach to determining legal presumptions or the optimal stan-
dard of proof in trials uses a framework in which a fact-finder, who is adjudicating
a possible crime committed already, minimizes verdict error costs. This paper ad-
dresses the problem from a different perspective. We focus on theex-antestage of
corruption prevention and investigate which legal presumption implements a target
level of corruption at lower overall social costs. The social costs are broadly defined
to include law enforcement costs, trial costs, verdict error costs, and any other net
direct losses inflicted on the society. The popular justification for presumption of
innocence is that societies attribute a large cost to wrongful convictions relative to
unpunished offenses. We show that favoring presumption of innocence can have
much larger benefits than just the minimization of verdict error costs, although we
also identify limitations of this rule.
Cast in terms of corruption, our analysis applies to any other type of crime
with minor qualifications. The main conclusion is that the socially optimal leagl
presumption rule depends on the targeted crime level. Specifically, for any given
crime, a general rule emerges that it is socially less costly to implement high
crime levels by presuming guilt and to implement low crime levels by presuming
innocence. In our single agent model, a high crime level means the agent commits a
specific crime with a probability exceeding some threshold level. Equivalently, our
model can be considered to have a continuum of agents in which a high crime level
implies that a large fraction of the agent population commits the crime. The exact
value of the threshold probability or the population fraction committing the crime
that separates high and low levels of crime depends on several variables, namely, the
probability and the cost of wrongful convictions and unpunished offenses, whether
collusion between law enforcers and potential criminals is possible, the relative
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costs of trials, whether rewards for successful law enforcers and penalties on the
convicted are bounded from above, and the precision of the evidence admitted in
trials to establish guilt under the two legal presumptions.
For corruption, generating high-quality, indisputable evidence of guilt may be
very difficult. Relying on such evidence to establish guilt under presumption of
innocence would imply a very high probability of unpunished offense. At the
same time, it would imply that the probability of a wrongful conviction based
on lower quality evidence admissible to court under presumption of guilt is rea-
sonably small. Under these conditions, presumption of guilt becomes the better
alternative to implement even intermediate levels of corruption targets. This is the
main explanation that our analysis offers for why the less developed countries in
which corruption is relatively high have resorted to presumption of guilt more
than have the western developed countries in which corruption is relatively low.
If the social cost of a wrongful conviction is deemed much smaller in these coun-
tries than in western countries, presumption of guilt gains further support. The
analysis also provides a plausible explanation for the concerted efforts of several
countries to revise and harmonize their legal systems to adopt pro-prosecution le-
gal presumptions in fighting international bribery which is widespread, according
to many observers, but was not even recognized as a criminal act until recently
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Finally, in jurisdictions in which resources to motivate
law enforcers are bounded, we show that presumption of guilt may become the
only alternative for implementing some intermediate range of corruption targets.
A range of very low corruption levels can not be implemented under the presumed
guilty rule because the net social marginal benefit of inducing enforcement effort
becomes negative due to unacceptably high probability of wrongful convictions.
Then, presumption of innocence becomes the only alternative.
We show that the impact of an upper bound on admissible penalties is to introduce
a minimal enforcement effort that should be induced. This effort level depends on a
simple balance between the likelihood of typeI and typeII errors in adjudication.
If shifting the burden of proof to criminal defendants increases the probability of
avoiding a typeII error by more than it increases the probability of committing
a type I error, accuracy in adjudication increases. Hence, a stronger deterrence
obtains so that the same crime level can be implemented through a smaller minimal
enforcement effort under presumption of guilt. This will be the case if the innocent
are more likely than the guilty to disprove an accusation based on the relatively low
quality evidence that is admissible under the presumption of guilt. This condition
is likely to hold for the crime of corruption. If, in addition, there is an upper
bound on penalties, the optimal enforcement effort is more likely to be constrained
under presumption of innocence. Then, presumption of innocence may lose its
cost advantage over presumption of guilt. This could provide a rationale for the
international efforts of the OECD and the Organization of American States to
fight corruption by shifting the burden of proof to public officials holding assets in
significant excess of their lawful earnings. If innocent officials can disprove such
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accusations easily while guilty officials cannot, shifting the burden of proof to the
officials can generate cost savings for implementing any given level of corruption.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. The principal’s problem is to choose〈w jA, w jS, Rj , F j 〉 to
minimize (1) subject to (4), (5), (6), (7I) or (7G) respectively, (8) and (9).
First we check to see if the incentive scheme that minimizes law enforcement
costs binds the agent’s participation constraint (4). Fix anyb̄ ∈ (0,1). Use the
equilibrium condition (6) to rewrite (4) as
UIA = wIA; UGA = wGA − (1− ri )µ(m)FG .




A can be lowered to reduce law en-
forcement costs but still satisfy (4). Thus,wIA= 0 and, by (6),wGA= (1−ri )z/[ phg+
(1− phg)(1− rg)− (1− ri )] > 0.
Similarly, the supervisor’s participation constraint is also binding. Since the
supervisor can always choose zero effort, net expected rewards from monitoring,
i.e., ERj (b̄,m) − c(m), are always nonnegative and, as we show below, will be
strictly positive. By settingw jS = c(m) − ERj (b̄,m)< 0,29 the principal extracts
fully the supervisor’s rent. Thus,w jS is determined once the effort level to be
induced by the principal is solved in the latter part of this proof.
Givenb̄ ∈ (0,1), the supervisor chooses an effort,m∗, to maximizeφS(m, b̄) ≡
ERj (b̄,m) − c(m). Condition (7I), or (6G) respectively, implies thatm∗ > 0 for
RI > 0 or (RGh , R
G
l ) > 0, respectively. The maximized net rewards equal
c′(m∗)
µ′(m∗)
µ(m∗)− c(m∗) > 0.30
For now, ignore the collusion-proofness constraints (8) and (9). Since the incen-
tive scheme must bind the agent’s participation constraint,w jA−EFj (b̄,m) = −b̄z.
Along withw jS derived above, substituting this equation into (1) yields
LECj (b̄,m) = c(m)− b̄z. (A1)
This expression is increasing inm; therefore, the principal should induce the lowest
effort possible.
29The inequalityw jS< 0 should not be interpreted literally as a negative wage, because the
supervisor’s outside option is normalized to zero. If the outside option is worth ¯w, w jS =
w̄+ c(m)−ERj (b̄,m), which can be positive.
30 ThatφS(m∗, b̄) will be positive, is easy to show:φS(0, b̄) = 0, becausec′(0) = 0,µ′(0) = ∞
andc(0)= 0, and then apply the fact thatφS(m, b̄) is increasing inm.
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Now introduce the possibility ofex-antecollusion. By making appropriate sub-
stitutions using the expression of expected rewards in Section 3.1 and (7I) or (7G)
in (8), theex-antecollusion-proofness condition (8) can be written in terms of the
equilibrium induced effortm as follows:
c′(m)
µ′(m)
µ(m)− c(m) ≥ z+ w jA. (A2)
The penalties are already given by (6) but they depend on an endogenous vari-
able, i.e., the induced effortm that is to be determined next. To obtain the expression
for rewards, which also depend on the induced effortm, we consider each legal
presumption separately.
PresumptionI. Under presumptionI the principal promises the supervisor
a single rewardRI if type-h evidence, which establishes guilt, is produced. To
obtain the equilibrium induced effort and the expression forRI , recall that law
enforcement costs given by (A1) are increasing inm. On the other hand, the left-
hand side of (A2) is also increasing inm, becomes arbitrarily large asm goes
to m+, and goes to zero asm goes to 0. The assertion that the left-hand side of
(A2) is unbounded above is proved in Claim 1, following the proof of Lemma 1.
Therefore, there exists a minimal effortmIz that satisfies (A2) with equality, where
wIA = 0.
We now argue that, thismIz will minimize law enforcement costs. First, we need
to show that thex-postcollusion-proofness constraint (9), which we have ignored
until now, is implied by theex-antecollusion-proofness condition (8). Rewrite
(8) as
b̄ phg R














Now by (7I ), RI = [c′(mIz )/µ′(mIz )][1/(b̄ phg)], and by (6),FI = z/[ phgµ(mIz )].
So,LECI = c(mIz )− b̄z.
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(1− rg)− (1− ri )
] ,
which, substituted into thex-antecollusion-proofness condition (A2), yields
c′(m)
µ′(m)
µ(m)− c(m) ≥ z
{





(1− rg)− (1− ri )
]}. (A3)
As under presumptionI, the principal must induce at least a minimal effortmGz
satisfying (A3) with equality.
Since (c′(m)/µ′(m))µ(m)− c(m) is increasing inm,mGz > mIz .
To check thatmGz minimizes law enforcement costs, we need to show thatex-post
collusion-proofness constraints in (9) are satisfied.Ex-antecollusion-proofness is
already satisfied through (A3), provided rewards (RGh , R
G
l ) are chosen to induce
mGz by satisfying Eq. (7G).31 Thus, we need to determine suitable penalty and

























) − FG[b̄(1− phg)(1− rg)+ (1− b̄)(1− ri )]
}
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z and satisfies (A3), and equivalently (8).












)− c (mGz )
≥ z− b̄z+ µ(mGz ) FG [b̄ phg + b̄ (1− phg) (1− rg)+ (1− b̄)(1− ri )],






] ≥ c(mGz )+ z(1− b̄) > 0,
31Crucial to the determination of law enforcement costs is the induced effortmGz . There can be
more than one combination of (RGh , R
G
l ) that is consistent withm
G
z , but we consider only one such
combination.
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implying RGh > F
G . Thus, the second constraint in (9) is satisfied. Therefore, the
minimized law enforcement costs under presumptionG are given by
LECG = c (mGz )− b̄z.
Finally, sincemIz < m
G
z , law enforcement costs will be lower under presumption
I. Q.E.D.
Claim 1. [c′(m)/µ′(m)]µ(m)− c(m) can be made arbitrarily large by inducing
an appropriatem through adjustments inRj .
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose not. Then there is a finiteη such that [c′(m)/µ′(m)]
µ(m)− c(m) ≤ η for all m that can be induced. Choose any particularm̃ induced
by an appropriate reward,R̃I , such that
c′(m̃)
µ′(m̃)
µ(m̃)− c(m̃) ≤ η.
Now choose a sufficiently largeRI , say ˜̃RI > R̃I , such that̄bphg
˜̃RIµ(m̃)− c(m̃)>
η. Clearlym̃ cannot be the equilibrium effort for the reward choice˜̃RI ; so let ˜̃m
be the equilibrium effort. Thus, we have
c′( ˜̃m)
µ′( ˜̃m)
µ( ˜̃m)− c( ˜̃m) > b̄ phg ˜̃RIµ(m̃)− c(m̃) > η,
which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. First consider the presumption ruleG. By Lemma 3,
b̄ ∈ (0, βG ] cannot be implemented under presumptionG. Now suppose that any










































) ≡ R̄G . (A4)
This completes the necessary part of the if and only if claim.
To show that (A4) is also sufficient for full collusion-proof implementation of












)] ≥ c(mGz )+ z+ wGA
= c(mGz )+ z+ (1− ri )z[phg + (1− phg)(1− rg)− (1− ri )] .
By (A4), there exist rewardsRGh andR
G
l that induce effortm
G
z , which satisfies this





) {c (mGz ) + z+ (1− ri )z[phg + (1− phg) (1− rg)− (1− ri )]
}
>













= (1− r i )
ρ
· FG .
Since 1− ri > ρ, R̄ > FG . Hence, it is possible to find rewardsRGh and RGl ,
not exceedinḡR, such that thex-postcollusion-proofness constraints hold and all
other equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
Now consider the presumption ruleI. Suppose that any corruption targetb̄ ∈











The right-hand side of the expression isR̄I(b̄) in the statement of the proposition.
Hence, we have shown the necessary part of the if and only if claim. That the
above condition is also sufficient for implementation of a specificb̄ ∈ (0,1),
follows directly from Lemma 1.














constraint (A5) cannot be satisfied for lowb̄-values given an upper bound rewardR̄.
In particular, given a fixed, finitēR such thatR̄≥ R̄G , even though all̄b ∈ (βG, 1)
can be implemented through presumptionG, no
b̄ ∈ (0, b̄I(R̄)),











Here we are assuming thatβG < b̄I(R̄).
Thus, the implementation targets strictly between zero and one can be divided
into three regions. The region (0, βG) is not implementable by either presump-
tion rule. The region (βG, b̄I(R̄)) can be implemented but only through presump-
tion ruleG. The region [̄bI(R̄), 1) can be implemented under both presumption
rules. Q.E.D.
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